Aggregate real dividends paid by industrial firms increased over the past two decades even though, as Fama and French (2001a) document, the number of dividend payers decreased by over 50%. The reason is that (i) the reduction in payers occurs almost entirely among firms that paid very small dividends, and (ii) increased real dividends from the top payers swamp the modest dividend reduction from the loss of many small payers. These trends reflect high and increasing concentration in the supply of dividends which, in turn, reflects high and increasing earnings concentration. For example, the 25 firms that paid the largest dividends in 2000 account for a majority of the aggregate dividends and earnings of industrial firms. Industrial firms exhibit a two-tier structure in which a small number of firms with very high earnings collectively generates the majority of earnings and dominates the dividend supply, while the vast majority of firms has at best a modest collective impact on aggregate earnings and dividends.
Introduction
In their intriguing study, "Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?," Fama and French (2001a) document a large decline over in the number and percent of nonfinancial and nonutility firms (hereafter, industrials) that pay dividends. Their analysis indicates that this dramatic change in dividend practices is due both to changes in the population of firms that are now publicly held (with many more public firms now exhibiting the characteristics of firms that historically have not paid dividends), and to a reduced propensity to pay dividends by firms whose characteristics historically would have led them to distribute cash to stockholders. Although Fama and French carefully state that their findings show a reduction in the number and percent of dividendpaying firms, their evidence is commonly interpreted as indicating that dividends themselves are disappearing.
1 The latter view seems more than plausible, given the striking fact that the number of dividend-paying industrials has declined by more than 1,000 firms (over 50%) over the last 20-25 years.
Although our evidence confirms a radical transformation in corporate dividend practices over the last two decades, it does not indicate that dividends are disappearing. Rather, dividends paid by industrial firms actually increased over 1978-2000, both in nominal and in real terms (by 224.6% and 22.7% respectively for our sample). Why did aggregate real dividends increase despite a 50%-plus decline in the number of payers? The answer is twofold: (i) the large reduction in payers occurred almost entirely among firms that paid very small dividends, with the loss of these firms' dividends having at best a minor impact on the aggregate supply, and (ii) dividends simultaneously increased substantially among the largest payers, reflecting a marked increase in their real earnings. In short, the increase in real dividends paid by firms at the top of the dividend distribution swamps the dividend reduction associated 1 For example, The New York Times and The Economist report that dividends have become less relevant and perhaps irrelevant, citing the findings of Fama and French (2001a) as well as low dividend yields and the popularity of stock repurchases ("Dividends Are Fading as Market Signals, Too," The New York Times, November 7, 1999, "Shares Without the Other Bit: In Corporate America, Paying Dividends Has Gone Out of Fashion," The Economist, November 20, 1999, and "Economics Focus: Dividends End," The Economist, January 20, 2002) . Time cites low dividend yields and an increased incidence of dividend omissions by healthy electric utility firms as evidence that "dividends have become only slightly more relevant than the gushing palaver in an annual report" ("Disappearing Dividends? Ending Payouts May Be a Good Thing for Investors," Time, February 2, 1998) .
with the loss of many small payers at the bottom.
These secular changes reflect high and increasing dividend concentration. For example, the 25 largest dividend payers, all of which are "old line" established firms, collectively supplied over half generates the preponderance of earnings, and that both dividend and earnings concentration has increased substantially from the (already high) level of two decades ago.
Changes in the cross-sectional distribution of earnings -especially among firms at the top end of the distribution -are the fundamental reason why real dollar dividends paid by industrial firms have increased even though, as Fama and French (2001a) conclude, industrial firms now exhibit a reduced propensity to pay dividends (i.e., they are now more likely to pay zero dividends, controlling for earnings and growth opportunities). We find that 100% of the firms with at least $1 billion in real earnings paid dividends in 1978, whereas 85.7% paid dividends in 2000, consistent with Fama and French's reduced propensity to pay. However, although a smaller proportion of firms with high real earnings now pays dividends, top earners continue to exhibit a very strong tendency to do so. And since top-end firms now produce so much more in real earnings, on net this group shows a large increase in real dividends even though a few very large earners, primarily technology firms, have been slow to initiate dividends. The end result is that aggregate dividends paid by industrial firms increased over 1978-2000 despite the reduced propensity to pay dividends.
Overall, the supply of dividends by industrial firms exhibits a two-tier structure in which a small number of firms with very high earnings collectively generates the majority of earnings and dominates the dividend supply, while the vast majority of firms has at best a modest collective impact on aggregate earnings and dividends. We discuss the implications of the two-tier structure for the dividend clientele and signaling hypotheses and for the evolution of corporate payout practices in Section 7. Section 2 begins the paper by describing our sampling procedure, and it also details the aggregate dividend increase from 1978 to 2000 for industrial firms. Section 3 documents the concentration of dividends and the consolidation therein that has occurred over the last two decades, while Section 4 does the same for earnings. Section 5 identifies the top payers, the top nonpayers, and the firms with the highest earnings in 2000. Section 6 documents how many of the 1978 dividend payers continued to pay dividends in 2000, the strong influence of these continuing payers on the 2000 dividend supply, and what happened to the remaining firms (primarily, they were acquired).
Sampling procedure and aggregate dividends, 1978-2000
Shoven (1986, and French's (2001a) finding that the number of dividend payers has fallen by more than 50% since 1978 (see fn 1 above). Of course, the government population is not confined to publicly traded industrials, the sample that Fama and French study, since it also includes private firms and publicly held financials and utilities. However, as we show below, aggregate dividends also increased for publicly traded industrials, thereby posing the conundrum that we study in this paper: why have aggregate dividends increased in the face of a radical decline in the number of payers?
Following Fama and French (2001a) , we sample CRSP industrial firms with SIC codes outside the ranges 4900-4949 and 6000-6999 (financials and utilities). We call nonfinancial and nonutility firms "industrials," while recognizing that this group also includes service firms, conglomerates, and perhaps other companies not conventionally labeled industrials. Like Fama and French (2001a) , we restrict attention to NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms with CRSP share codes 10 or 11 for at least one month of each year in question, and with nonmissing December share price and quantity data. We consider only CRSP firms with dividends and earnings on Compustat (the CRSP/Compustat sample). Our sample sizes differ slightly from those of Fama and French because we place different requirements on the availability of specific data items, and probably also because of differences in how we implement sampling criteria regarding the monthly observation of CRSP share and/or SIC codes. Fama and French examine trends over 1978-1998, while we employ data that became available after publication of their study and therefore examine trends over 1978-2000. proportionately exceeds the increase in these payers. Because the precipitous decline in the number of dividend-paying industrials is not matched by a similar decline for financials/utilities, it cannot simply reflect a general increase in managers' reluctance to pay dividends, but must instead relate to some underlying fundamental change(s) largely confined to industrial firms. For example, income tax law changes that had similar effects on nonindustrial and industrial firms' incentives to pay dividends cannot explain the secular trends in Table 1 . aggregate dividends reflects the underlying growth in earnings, although as expected, dividends grow more smoothly than earnings, (iii) dividend payers account for the vast bulk of industrial earnings in all years [as in Fama and French (2001a, p.18) ], and (iv) aggregate losses increase markedly from 1978 to the early 1990s, reaching massive levels in the late 1990s. In the remainder of the paper, we compare aggregate industrial dividends for 1978 and 2000, since the former year marks the beginning of the longterm decline in the number of payers and the latter has the latest available data. As Fig. 1 shows, there is nothing unusual about aggregate dividends in these two years. Rather, the increase from 1978 to 2000 is simply part of a steady long-run uptrend in aggregate dividends paid by industrial firms. Table 2 do not suffer from this problem, as they were generated using Fama and French's sampling approach. Nor are they substantively affected by the loss of CRSP firms with data unavailable on Compustat. Using CRSP dividend data for the latter firms, we find that the $7.1 billion real dividend increase from 1978 to 2000 (reported in Table 2 ) narrows by only $129 million, so that real dividends increased for the full set of CRSP firms. period, the number of firms paying less than $100 million decreased by 1,280 and this decline manifests primarily in the two smallest dividend classes, with the 1,069 net reduction in firms paying less than $5 million per year accounting for 85.8% of the overall net decline of 1,246 firms. And while the 1,069-firm reduction in small payers is large in number, the dollar magnitude of the $1.1 billion in dividends lost is dwarfed by the $12.6 billion in dividends gained from the 34-firm increase for the $100 millionplus category.
Dividend concentration and the increase therein over the last two decades
In sum, the top categories of dividend payers now contain more firms and these firms now pay substantially higher total dividends, while the bottom categories now contain many fewer firms and these firms now pay modestly lower total dividends. The net result is a large decrease in the number of payers accompanied by an increase in aggregate dividends, which reflects the fact that the top-end firms dominate, while the bottom-end firms have little impact on the aggregate dividend supply. Black and Scholes (1974) and Miller (1977) argue that what matters to investors is the aggregate supply of securities with particular characteristics (e.g., dividends, taxable interest returns, etc.), and not the number of firms delivering that supply or the quantity delivered by any one firm. In their view, the decline in the number of payers is of little consequence so long as sufficient dividends are supplied to meet the demand for dollars delivered currently in that form. Since aggregate real dividends increased over 1978-2000, the decrease in the number of payers was not caused by a reduction in aggregate demand, but instead must reflect changes in the factor(s) that determine firms' dividend supply decisions. Lintner's (1956) 
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The pooled earnings distribution of dividend payers and nonpayers
As background for our analysis of the earnings of dividend payers and nonpayers, Table 6 summarizes the cross-sectional earnings distribution of all firms (payers and nonpayers) combined. and Dichev (1997), French (2001a, 2001b) , and Ritter and Welch (2002) who document a substantially increased loss incidence in recent years. While in 2000 most firms (1,554, not reported in Table 6 ) lost less than $10 million, 94 firms lost at least $100 million. Technology firms are prominent among the latter group, which includes Amazon, Web MD, Webvan, Priceline, Covad, Akamai, Ariba, JDS Uniphase, Earthlink, Broadcom, PSINet, MP3.Com, and CMGI. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992) document that losses play a key role in dividend cuts and omissions. These findings, combined with recent years' large increase in the incidence of losses, help explain why so many fewer industrial firms now pay dividends.
The separate earnings of dividend payers and nonpayers
The strong link between losses and the failure to pay dividends is evident from Table 7 , which partitions the pooled distributions of real earnings from Table 6 into separate distributions for dividend payers and for nonpayers. Virtually all (2,056 of 2,144, or 95.9%) firms that reported losses failed to pay a dividend in 2000 (row 9 of panel A). The view that losses have driven many more firms to forego dividends is further supported by the fact that in 2000 nonpayers as a group lost $10.4 billion, while dividend payers as a group earned $108.3 billion.
Both panels of Table 7 document a strong positive relation between the level of earnings and the proportion of firms paying dividends, and they also show that the relation in 2000 is weaker than it was in 1978. For example, only 2.3% of the firms with earnings of $100 million-plus failed to pay dividends in 1978, compared to 28.1% in 2000. The fact that a smaller proportion of firms with a given level of real earnings paid dividends in 2000 than did so in 1978 is consistent with Fama and French's (2001a) conclusion that industrial firms now exhibit a lower propensity to pay dividends (although, unlike the estimates of Fama and French, our numbers do not control for growth opportunities). In 2000, a number of firms with large positive earnings failed to pay dividends (see rows 1-3 in both panels of Table 7) , whereas no firms with comparably large earnings failed to do so in 1978.
Despite this reduced propensity to pay, aggregate real dividends increased by $7.1 billion from 1978 to 2000 (per Table 2 2000. In sum, the substantial increase in real earnings at the top end of the distribution, coupled with the continued strong tendency of top earners to pay dividends, is sufficient to generate an aggregate dividend increase despite both the large reduction in the number of small dividend payers and the modest increase in the number of firms with very large earnings that fail to pay dividends.
Payout ratios and the propensity to pay dividends
The term "reduced propensity to pay" seems to imply that dividend-paying firms now distribute a lower proportion of their earnings than they used to.
3 That there has not been a reduced propensity to pay in this sense is clear from the essentially flat payout ratio data in Table 8 . Row 1 of the table reports that the ratio of aggregate dividends to aggregate earnings of payers and nonpayers combined increased slightly, both when current year earnings are used in the denominator (from 36.9% to 39.3%), and when five-year average earnings are used (from 41.7% to 42.0%). 4 A shortcoming of the row 1 payout ratios is that they combine the earnings of payers and nonpayers and thus provide no information about the time series behavior of the payout ratios of dividend-paying firms. Table 8 's remaining payout ratios remedy this deficiency by incorporating only the earnings of dividend-paying firms. Row 2 reports the ratio of aggregate dividends to the total earnings of dividend payers, while row 3 presents the median of individual firms' payout ratios. Rows 4 and 5 report the same statistics for the "constant composition sample" of 474 firms that paid dividends in both 1978 and 2000.
Although the latter sample suffers from a survivorship bias, it also likely captures genuine changes in payout policy as opposed to differences over time in the population of dividend-paying firms. The payout ratios in rows 3 and 5 give equal weight to all observations, while those in rows 2 and 4 give more weight to firms with large dividends and earnings.
Overall, payout ratios exhibit little change over the last two decades, with some of the ratios in Table 8 exhibiting slight increases and others slight decreases. Row 2 shows that the ratio of aggregate dividends to total earnings of payers declined 2.4%, from 37.9% in 1978 to 35.5% in 2000, based on a single year's earnings, while the ratio based on five-year average earnings decreased 0.1%, from 42.5% to 42.4%. Row 3 indicates that the median payout ratio increased 2.2%, from 26.2% to 28.4%, based on the one-year earnings measure, and decreased 0.7%, from 31.1% to 30.4%, based on five-year average earnings. For the constant composition sample in rows 4 and 5, three of four payout ratios decreased (by 3.6%, 3.4%, and 1.8%) while the other increased (by 5.5%). For this last sample, the median change in the payout ratio (as opposed to the change in the median, which is reported in Table 2 ). Their dominance of the aggregate dividend supply reflects these 25 firms' $50. While earnings concentration is striking among dividend payers, it is also very high among nonpayers. Table 10 25 nonpayers respectively generated 31.0% and 43.2% of such earnings, and just 39 nonpayers accounted for a majority (50.1%, not reported in Table 10 ). 6 That a handful of technology firms dominates the earnings of nonpayers is clear from scanning the identities of the 25 firms in Table 10 , and any dampening of the aggregate dividend supply in recent years is due in no small part to their failure to initiate dividends.
These firms' decisions to forgo dividends more likely reflect their continued high growth prospects than a reduced propensity to pay dividends and, as their growth prospects decline, they will likely come under pressure to pay dividends. Microsoft, widely viewed as a bellwether technology company, has recently announced plans to institute a regular dividend, and Qualcomm and Fedex have also initiated dividends, so that three of the top 25 nonpayers in Table 10 would now be reclassified as payers. Additionally, the numerous corporate scandals uncovered in the last year or so may prompt growth firms to initiate dividends at an earlier stage, in order to increase investor confidence in their reported earnings. Moreover, President Bush's January 2003 proposal to eliminate the dividend tax penalty would, if enacted, surely put more pressure on firms to pay dividends. All these recent developments suggest that a future reversal of the decline in the number of dividend-paying industrials is a reasonable possibility. Table 11 identifies the 28 firms with $1 billion-plus in real earnings in 2000, which is just over $2.5 billion in year 2000 dollars. Together, these 28 firms account for almost two-thirds (65.6%) of 2000 aggregate industrial earnings. In 2000, 24 of these firms paid dividends, and in total their dividends represent a majority (50.1%) of the industrial dividend supply. The 28 largest earners are primarily "old line" firms that pay very large dividends, but they also include some profitable younger technology firms that pay either modest or no dividends. Of the four large earners that failed to pay 2000 dividends, Microsoft has since initiated a dividend, Oracle and Cisco have said they would consider doing so, and
WorldCom's accounting fraud implies that its #19 ranking in Table 11 substantially overstates its true earnings position in 2000.
Overall, industrial firms are characterized by a two-tier structure based on earnings, with 25 or so firms (about one-half of 1% of all industrials) accounting for most earnings and dividends in 2000, and with the vast majority of firms collectively delivering small earnings and dividends. Tables 9, 10, and 11 show that the top handful of earners generated the bulk of corporate earnings and, despite some large earners like Microsoft that did not pay dividends, also supplied the majority of industrial dividends in 2000. We also know from Table 6 hence of the decline in the number of dividend payers, is due to the recent merger wave. However, as Fama and French (2001a, p.11 ) point out, since dividend payers and nonpayers were acquired at about the same rates during the last two decades, acquisitions cannot explain the decline in the proportion of payers.
Summary and implications
This paper reports evidence that industrial firms' dividends are highly concentrated, and that dividend concentration has increased over the past two decades. We document that, while many fewer firms paid dividends in 2000 than did so in 1978, aggregate real dividends increased over that period.
The combination of a decreased number of payers and increased aggregate dividends reflects high and increased earnings concentration. In 2000, most firms with very high earnings paid dividends, and the increased real earnings of the largest dividend payers is responsible for the aggregate increase in dividends and the concomitant increase in dividend concentration over 1978-2000. In 2000, nearly half 9 We calculate the expected attrition (compounded at either 0.6% or 2.7%) over 22 years starting from a base of 2,176 firms, the number of 1978 payers. The abnormal number of acquisitions equals 1,249 minus the expected attrition. The expected attrition at Fama and French's 3.9% merger rate over 1978-1999 is 1,269 firms, which is virtually identical to the 1,249-firm decline in Table 12. of industrial firms reported losses and, as one would expect, few of these firms paid dividends. The decline over 1978-2000 in the number of dividend payers occurred predominantly among firms that previously paid very small real dividends, and is due primarily to acquisitions and secondarily to financial distress. For example, we find that 57.4% of the firms that paid dividends in 1978 were subsequently delisted because they were acquired, and that the abnormal level of acquisitions during the recent merger wave accounts for much, but not all, of the decline in the number of payers. We also find that the payout ratios of firms that pay dividends exhibit little change over 1978-2000.
These findings collectively suggest that the decline in dividend payers over 1978-2000 is not attributable to factors that put across-the-board downward pressure on dividends or on payout ratios. For example, income tax law changes cannot plausibly underlie the decline in payers, since any increase in the dividend tax penalty that led many more firms to pay zero dividends also should have led dividend payers to markedly reduce their payout ratios, and we observe no such reduction. The same logic implies that the sharp reduction in the number of payers was not caused by demand-and/or supply-related factors that generated a cross-sectionally pervasive reduction in the marginal incentive to pay dividends. This inference is reinforced by the fact that the earnings of nonpayers, like those of payers, are highly concentrated, with 25 firms accounting for almost half the total earnings of all nonpayers with positive earnings in 2000. Over one-third of these total earnings come from just 13 firms with a strong technology bent: Microsoft, Oracle, WorldCom, Cisco, Applied Materials, Comcast, Cox
Communications, Sun, EMC, Dell, Micron Technology, AOL Time Warner, and Amgen. The decision to forego dividends by high growth technology firms with substantial earnings more likely reflects industry-specific investment opportunities rather than economy-wide factors that reduced all firms' incentives to pay dividends.
Our findings on dividend concentration cast doubt on the empirical importance of the dividend clientele and signaling hypotheses (Allen and Michaely, 1995 , survey the extensive literatures on these two hypotheses). Clientele theories attribute heterogeneity in dividend policies to the demands of different investors who, for tax or behavioral reasons, prefer either to hold or to avoid dividend-paying stocks. Black and Scholes (1974) discuss the difficulties of forming well-diversified portfolios of stocks that pay either high or low dividends, and note the dearth of nondividend payers to service the demands of the many investors who prefer capital gains. While on the surface the large increase since the late 1970s in the number of nondividend-paying firms might appear to rectify this shortcoming, the attributes of the current population of nonpayers suggest that well-diversified portfolios of their stocks are not easily constructed. Among nonpayers in 2000, the majority of firms has negative earnings averaged over 1996-2000, many are newly listed growth firms, and many are from the technology sector. Even if some investors could construct well-diversified but dividend-free portfolios from this population, it is questionable whether the aggregate demands of all clienteles seeking to invest in such portfolios could be met, given the substantial dividend concentration that characterizes today's stock market.
If the demand to satisfy heterogeneous clienteles were truly a first-order determinant of dividend policies, we would expect to observe substantial dividend heterogeneity among the prominent firms whose securities are important components of well-diversified portfolios. As long as high tax bracket investors desire to invest substantial amounts of wealth, we should observe a comparably large set of prominent firms that do not pay dividends, and these nonpayers should be spread across a broad spectrum of industries. And, within any given industry, we should see a mix of large dividend-paying and nonpaying firms. What we observe, instead, is (i) few firms with very high earnings fail to pay dividends, (ii) these firms are mainly bunched in a narrow industry sector (technology), and (iii) very large firms in other industries all tend to pay dividends. The fact that the market does not supply a broad spectrum of dividend heterogeneity either across or within industries suggests that pressure to satisfy heterogeneous clienteles is at best a second-order determinant of dividend decisions. It would seem to follow that clientele pressure can have a major impact only in unusual circumstances, for example, when a controlling stockholder's preferences shape a given firm's dividend policy as, e.g., in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000).
Our finding that dividends are highly concentrated among a small number of firms with substantial earnings also raises doubts that signaling is a first-order determinant of corporate dividend possible that signaling motives may be important on the margin for some prominent dividend-paying firms, it is hard to envision plausible scenarios in which a material portion of aggregate dividends reflect signaling motives.
Our evidence on the high and increasing level of dividend concentration adds to a growing body of empirical research that documents major changes in corporate payout practices over the last 25 to 50
years. Prior studies have identified a number of other important trends, including (i) a marked reduction in the 1970s in the sensitivity of dividends to earnings, as evidenced by a decline in the typical Lintner (1956) speed-of-adjustment coefficient coupled with target payout ratio stability from the late 1940s through at least the mid-1980s (Choe, 1990 (Choe, , 1991 , (ii) the virtual disappearance of special dividends in recent years, despite their prominence in the 1950s and earlier (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2000) , (iii) a reduction in firms' propensity to pay dividends over the last two decades of the 20th century (Fama and French, 2001a) , (iv) the emergence of stock repurchase as a popular payout technique in the 1960s and early 1970s (Dann, 1981; Masulis, 1980; and Vermaelen, 1981) , and (v) the massive increase in repurchase activity in the mid-1980s (Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Allen and Michaely, 1995) . The interplay of these trends and their possible relation to the high and increasing concentration of earnings documented here are issues that merit future investigation.
Finally, our evidence reveals that publicly traded industrial firms exhibit a two-tier structure based on dollar earnings. The first tier contains a few very high earners, most of which pay dividends, and these firms' dividends collectively dominate the aggregate supply. The second tier contains many firms which, individually and jointly, have modest earnings and which collectively contribute little to the aggregate dividend supply. In essence, the differing behavior of first-and second-tier firms explains why aggregate dividends increased as the number of payers declined over the past two decades. The two-tier structure also raises a possible inconsistency between the findings of Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968) and dividend theories in which supply adjustments play a central role. For example, the Black and Scholes' (1974) equilibrium would seem to periodically require material dividend changes by first-tier firms, since second-tier companies' collective dividends are small. But Lintner and Fama and Babiak show that such well-established firms tend to adjust dividends only marginally and then primarily upward in response to their own earnings increases. The interesting empirical question is whether the apparently "sticky" dividend practices of first-tier firms exhibit sufficient variation (in both directions) to provide the supply adjustments critical to the Black and Scholes dividend theory.
The two-tier structure is perhaps the signature characteristic that determines the dividend supply of industrial firms, and it has been so for at least two decades (and probably longer). Although our evidence is limited to dividends, we conjecture that the small set of top-tier firms is also responsible for the majority of cash payouts via stock repurchase. Three observations are consistent with this conjecture.
First, Fama and French (2001a) report that stock repurchases are primarily the province of dividendpaying firms. Second, earnings are highly concentrated, with a handful of firms generating the bulk of industrial earnings and dividends, and these firms may also use their earnings to support repurchases.
Finally, for S&P 500 firms in the late 1990s, Liang and Sharpe (1999, fig. 1 ) document substantial gross (as well as net of stock option exercise) dollar repurchase volume, with gross repurchases the same order of magnitude as dividends -facts consistent with our conjecture that top-tier firms dominate aggregate repurchase activity. Whatever the ultimate verdict on the concentration of repurchase volume, future analyses of payout policy should recognize that a few large earners dominate the dividend supply, while the vast majority of firms collectively contributes little to aggregate earnings and dividends. The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have share codes 10 or 11. Industrial firms are defined as those with SIC codes outside the ranges 4900-4949 and 6000-6999 (financial and utility companies). The sample is restricted to firms for which Compustat has non-missing dividends and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21 and 18) for the year in question. For each year, the data in this figure are based on Compustat's year assignment, whereas the data in all other tables are generated under the Fama and French (2001a, p. 40) convention of assigning financial data to years based on the calendar year in which the fiscal year-end falls. The alternative year-end conventions have little effect on the aggregate dollar magnitudes of the variables that we analyze. Total earnings for dividend payers are the sum of earnings for all firms that pay a positive dividend during the year in question. 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Aggregate dividends
Aggregate earnings
Total earnings of dividend payers Aggregate losses Table 3 Concentration of total dollar dividends paid by industrial firms in 1978 and in 2000
Firms are ranked from the largest to smallest total dollar dividends paid in each year (per Compustat). The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have share codes 10 and 11 and SIC codes outside the ranges 4900-4949 and 6000-6999. A firm is included only if Compustat reports dividends and earnings before extraordinary items for the year in question (Compustat items 21 and 18). A firm's dividends are the amounts reported for the fiscal years ending in 1978 or 2000. For 2000, the row corresponding to firms ranked from 901 to 1000 has 29 firms because there are 929 dividend payers that meet our sampling criteria in 2000. Each cell amount is rounded to the nearest significant digit, which explains a few minor discrepancies across row or column total figures. Table 4 Number of firms and real dividend payments in 1978 and in 2000 for samples of industrial firms that paid given amounts of real dividends ($ millions, 1978 dollars)
The sample is comprised of NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP with share codes 10 or 11 and SIC codes outside the intervals 4900-4949 and 6000-6999. A firm is included only if Compustat reports dividends and earnings before extraordinary items for the year in question (Compustat items 21 and 18). A firm's dividends are the amounts reported for the fiscal years ending in 1978 or 2000. Real dividends are given in millions of dollars, and are nominal payments converted to 1978 dollars using the consumer price index. Each cell amount is rounded to the nearest significant digit, which explains a few minor discrepancies across category totals. Table 5 Concentration of earnings of industrial firms that paid dividends in 1978 and in 2000
Firms are ranked from the largest to smallest total dollar dividends paid in each year (per Compustat). The table reports the percent of total earnings generated by dividend-paying firms that are accounted for by the top 100 dividend payers, the next largest 100 payers, and so on. The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have share codes 10 and 11 and SIC codes outside the ranges 4900-4949 and 6000-6999. The payout ratios in rows 1 and 2 are based on aggregate dividends paid by industrial firms in 1978 or in 2000. Row 1 takes the denominator to be the sum of earnings for all industrials (payers and nonpayers), while row 2 takes the denominator to be the sum of earnings for payers only. Row 3 reports the median firm's payout ratio within the set of firms that paid dividends. The payout ratios in row 4 and 5 are based on dividends and earnings for the constant composition sample of 474 firms that paid dividends in both 1978 and in 2000. Row 4 defines the payout ratio in a given year as (1) total dividends paid by firms in the constant composition sample divided by (2) total earnings of all firms in that sample. Row 5 reports the median firm's payout ratio within the constant composition sample. The columns marked "One-year earnings" report payout ratios based on earnings in the year in question. 
